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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the effectiveness of the Western Australian Environmental Protection 
Authority (EPA), from its inception in 1971 to 1996. While environmental concerns have 
risen considerably in recent times, environmental awareness can be traced back to early 
historical beginnings. Yet, despite this initiaJ awareness it took some time before 
environmental problems permeated the public consciousness, to occupy the political 
agenda. However, in the early 1970s, govc.nments throughout the First World responded to 
research and heightened awareness of environmental concerns, with specific legislation to 
protect the environment. A common feature of the legislation, was the provision for a main 
administrative body with designated powers and responsibilities to assist in environmental 
management. Hence, this study undertakes a review of the environmental protection 
legislation in Western Australia, with specific concentration upon the EPA. This is done by 
evaluating the original Environmental Protection Act 1971 (EP Act), and its successor the 
1986 EP Act. In aodition, the significance of two sets of amendments to the main 
legislation, in 1980 and 1993, have been explored. This study found that the 1986 EP Act 
was the strongest environmental legislation enacted in Western Australia. It increased the 
power and influence of the EPA, which enhanced its ability to provide adequate 
environmental advice to government. However, the power and influence of the EPA appear 
to have been, restricted by the 1993 amendments. Moreover, a common trend emerged over 
the period studied, which indicated an ideological difference between the two major 
political parties concerning environmental legislation and the strength and independence of 
the EPA. Finally, the need for governments to adopt a long-term approach to environmental 
management is recommended. 
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Chapter One 
An Historical Background to the rise of En\·ironmrntalism. 
Environmentalism is considered by many as a relatively recent addition to modern 
political thought. Indeed, this thesis wilJ focus upon a modern institution namely the 
Western Australian Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), which was established 
in 197 I. The growth of environmental problems in recent times has intensified the 
chaJlenge for proponents to provide long term solutions. As a result contemporary 
environmental groups often fail to acknowledge the efforts made by previous 
generations to address similar problems (Papadakis, 1993, p. 45). While it is true that 
the extent of environmental issues has risen considerably in the past few decades, 
environmental concerns have a much longer history. In Greece for example the first 
signs of widespread misuse of the environment emerged around 650 BC as population 
rose and settlements expanded. Concerns with land degradation from overgrazing and 
removal of trees, were expressed by ancient Greek writers such as Xenophon and 
Aristo•le, and even more graphically by Plato in Critias (Panting, 1991, p. 76). Similar 
problems of soil erosion were identified in Italy a few centuries later as population 
pressure increased the demand for land and timber. Moreover, continuous examples of 
environmenta1 destruction were documented at various stages throughout history. 
However, despite these early warnings there was little evidence of universal public 
concern until well after the induf;trial revolution. 
Environmental concerns increased following widespread social and economic change 
brought by the industrial revolution in Europe and America. The most profound change 
was a drarnutic expansion in the production of goods. Consequently, labour was 
concentrated in urban areas placing even greater demands on resources especially timber 
and later charcoal (Panting, 1991, p. 277). At first, environmental awareness was 
confined to the countries that experienced the most rapid form of industrialisation. 
Hence, to a large extent the environmental movement was a reaction to the threats posed 
to nature from the process of industrialisation (Heywood, 1992, p. 243). "Among the 
most notable early groups concerned with environmental protection were the Society for 
the Protection of Nature formed in I 854 in France, the Commons Open Spaces and 
Footpaths Preservation Society founded in 1865 in Britain, and the Sierra Club 
established in 1892 in the United States of America" (Papadakis. 1993, p. 46). While 
these groups had some success influencing legislation most notably for the setting aside 
of national parks, it was some time before the environment became a major issue on the 
political agenda. 
The prevailing view among political thinkers before the J 960s was that nature could be 
used purely as an "economic resource" to meet human demands, without much thought 
to the limits of natural resources. This view stemmed from the anthropocentric 
mechanistic version of reality formulated by Rene Descartes (Dobson, 1995, p. 40). 
Under this doctrine the natural world is theorised as a machine with no intrinsic value. 
This encouraged a human relationship of domination and control of nature (Merchant, 
1993, p. 276). While the major political ideologies diverged on many issues the belief in 
anthropocentricism was central to all. As a result, the holders of the main political 
ideologies were dedicated to the same goal of greater material affluence, for the benefit 
of humans (Heywood, 1992, p. 245). The main contention, however, was how this could 
be accomplished. Hence, to a large extent political debate was reduced to and revolved 
around the best means of achieving the goal of economic growth. 
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The pursuit of economic growth was central to shaping the ideas, belief..;; and values of 
humans over a number of decades and became the dominant social paradigm. This has 
been referred to as the "exclusionist paradigm" because it excludes human beings from 
the laws of nature (Porter and Brown, 1991, p. 27). The exclusionist pamdigm is based 
on the assumptions of neoclassical economics and the belief in the unfettered free 
market. According to this view, humans have the capacity to use technology to 
compensate for scarce resources with greater efficiency and innovation. The most 
frequently used example to highlight this claim was in the area of food production. Crop 
sizes have significantly increased with the use of insecticides and chemical fertilisers. 
Moreover, food life was extended with the use of processing, canning, freeze-drying, 
additives and in some cases genetic engineering (Heywood, 1992, p. 253). Since 
proponents of this view were primarily concerned with material wealth, and nature was 
not considered a constraining factor, the exclusionist paradigm did not consider the 
environment relevant to economic growth (Porter and Brown, 1991, p. 27). 
However, the dominant exclusionist paradigm came under challenge from the 1960s 
onwards. A series of events including the extent of destruction caused by nucJear 
weapons in World War Two, and the potential for even more devastation during the 
cold war period, raised a great deal of concern. Environmenta1 awareness was 
heightened with the release in 1962 of Silent Spring by Rachel Carson. The book was 
aimed at a wider public audience and designed to shock people into action against the 
dangers of chemical pesticides (Me Cormick, 1995, p. 67). The strategy worked, and the 
public came to realise for the first time that technology could not only improve 
production and market forces, but also could intlict unlimited environmental damage. In 
addition the work of Paul Ehrlich The Population Bomb (1968) and Garrett Hardin 
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Tragedy of the Commons (1968) raised the spectre of the debate by linking 
environmental concerns to overpopulation (Vincent, 1992, p. 21 1). The issue of 
exponential population growth was first raised by Thomas Mal thus in J 798. However, 
his assertions were dismissed because he failed to anticipate the capacity for technology 
to enhance food production. This apparent win for technology over nature may help 
explain the complacency of political leaders in addressing environmental issues. 
Nevertheless, the environmental argument was extended by the Club of Rome Limits to 
Growth Thesis in 1974. The researchers combined five trends of global environmental 
concerns in their study, namely accelerating industrialisation, rapid population growth, 
widespread malnutrition, depletion of non-renewable resources and a deteriorating 
environment (Dobson, 1995, p.73). While there were limitations to the study, the main 
principles and conclusions were adopted by and advanced the cause of 
environmentalists throughout the world. The primary conclusion drawn from the report 
was that technology merely shifted the problem around and could result in larger 
environmental problems such as po1Jution. Hence, the opposing view to the exclusionist 
paradigm was that technology may extend the period of industrial and population 
growth, but cannot alter the fact that the earth's canying capacity is finite (Dpbson, 
1995, p. 75). The Limits to Growth Thesis was followed by a constant stream of 
environmental literature throughout the 1970s that enhanced ecological awareness on a 
global scale. 
This awareness led to a growing realisation that the exponential population growth 
combined with demands for a higher standard of living in the First World placed 
enonnous pressure on the environment. Consequently, environmental concern became 
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more acute and radical, because of the fear that the unfettered exploitation of nature 
could threaten the future existence of humans, and the planet itself (Heywood, 1992, 
p. 244). '!'his resulled in a proliferation of environmental groups around the world 
challenging the existing ideologies and demanding government action. In the United 
States for example, a change in priority saw the creation of new organisations such as 
the Environmental Defence Fund, and Friends of the Earth (Me Connick, 1995, p. 171 ). 
Friends of the Earth was established by David Brower in 1969 following a split with the 
earlier formed Sierra Club. His philosophy was more radical than the previous interest 
groups, but was widely adopted by the larger more pro-active groups such as 
Green peace, which was formed in Canada in 1972. One of the strategies central to the 
new environmental lobby groups was a vigorous campaigning effort designed to draw 
maximum public attention to the environmental cause. While these groups varied in size 
and influence throughout the First World, they all adopted similar intensive lobbying 
tactics. 
In AustraJia, the response to euvironmental awareness corre~ponded with events in 
America, Canada and various other First World countries. As a result, a number of 
voluntary environmental and conservation groups were established in Australia during 
the 1960s. In 1965 the first national organisation the Australian Conservation 
Foundation was fortned (Papadakis, 1993, p. 105). Among the numerous voluntary 
conservation groups established around the same time were the National Trust of 
Australia (NSW), the Civic Trust of South Australia and the Conservation Council of 
Victoria. In Western Australia the Nature Conservation Council of WA was fortned in 
1967, and is still actively campaigning on a wide range of environmental issues 
(Churchward, 1991, p. 33). Surprisingly, support for environmental groups did not 
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transfer into the creation of specific "Green" political parties, until the early 1990s in 
Australia. This contrasted with trends in other parts of the world such as Western 
Europe. For example, the first national green party in Europe was established in Britain 
in 1973 with limited electoral success, although the electoral system in Britain does not 
favour smaller parties (Me Cormick, 1995, p. 208). On the other hand, the German 
green party was not fanned until 1979, but achieved notable electoral success in 1983 
having secured 27 seats in the Bundestag. 
Governmental Statutory Response to Environmental Concerns. 
One possible explanation for the overall lack of green political party success was the 
ability of the major parties to incorporate and respond to rising environmental awareness 
during the 1970s (Me Cormick, 1995, p. 155). As a result, governments throughout the 
First World develope1 similar policies to address environmental concerns. The preferred 
option in providing environmental protection was by public consultation backed up with 
strong statutory powers (Grinlinton, 1990, p. 74). The common law was deemed 
insufficiently suited to cope with the growing number of environmental issues, as it 
mainly provides protection for private individual rights, rather than matters of universal 
public concern (Bates, 1995, p. 8). Hence, there was an increase in legislation 
throughout the First World, designed specifically to manage environmental issues. 
However, once committed to legislation, governments had to balance the conflicting 
demands between environmental protection and economic development in a diminishing 
policy space (Kellow and Niemeyer, 1999, p. 206). 
Despite the vast diffrorence between First World countries, the 3tructure of the 
legislation was remarkably similar, with the creation of at least one administrative body 
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and the specification of its powers, functions and responsibilities (Hollick, 1985, p. 
116). Hence, the first Department of the Environment was created in Britain in 1970, 
although it was given limited powers and responsibilities. In America the National 
Environmental Policy Act was enacted on I January 1970, which allowed for the 
creation of the Environmental Protection Agency later that year (Me Cormick, 1995, p. 
167). Similarly, Japan responded to public pressure for pollution control measures by 
establishing a national Environment Agency in July 1971 (O'Brien, 1978, p. 41). In 
Australia a Federa1 Office for the Environment was set up by Prime Minister John 
Gorton in 1971, but it received insufficient resources and was therefore inadequate. 
Moreover, under a Federal system of governance in Australia, historically, the 
responsibility for environmental protection lay with State governments (Bates, 1995, p. 
76). Consequently, in New South Wales a State Pollution Control Commission was 
created in 1971, and in Victoria a Ministry for Conservation was formed in 1973 
(Papadakis, 1993, p. 107). 
In Western Australia, the first legislation to protect the environment the Physical 
Environmental Protection Act was introduced into Pa.rJiament by th;;,; Liberal-Country 
Party Government. Although it received Royal assent on November 30, I 970 it was 
never proclaimed and remained inoperative. One explanation given for the delay, was 
that the person chosen to head the environmental body, Dr Brian 0' Brie9, was not 
ready to take up his position (WAPD, Thursday 7 October I97I, p. 1948). Subsequently, 
the Brand Government was defeated at the election in 1971, and the new Labor 
Government decided to bring in tougher legislation with stronger ·~eeth" (0' Brien, 
I 978, p. 43). The main administrative body the Environmental Protection Authority 
(EPA) was formed as part of the Environmental Protection Act 1971, which became 
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op~rative by proclamation in the Government Gazette on December 17, 1971. The three 
inaugurdl members of the EPA were Dr Brian 0' Brien, a Professor of Physics and 
Space Science, who was appointed chairman, eminent barrister Philip Adams was 
appointed deputy chainnan and Professor of Zoology Bert Main (0' Brien, 1991, p. 5). 
The EPA was given responsibility for coordinating all activities necessary to protect, 
restore or improve the environment in Western Australia (WAPD, 23 September 1971, 
p. 1738). The EPA however, noted in its first report that it would have to develop 
principles on a case by case basis, as it could not look to preceding environmental 
bodies for guidance. It intended to achieve this, mindful of the need to balance planning 
for the future, with the practical and economic requirements of the present generation 
(EPA Annual Report, 1972, p. 5). The EPA expressed its profound belief in the 
importance of public awareness and participation in environmental management. It 
looked to the experience overseas that detailed the enonnous expense required to rectify 
environmental degradation. Hence, the Authority developed a number of principles with 
the three main ones being, 
i) An attempt to strike a balance between conservation and development. 
ii) The importance of informed public participation in environmental 
management, and 
iii) Environmental correction is much more expensive than environmental 
protection. 
The EPA perfonns a number of functions in pursuing environmental protection. 
However, its three main principles are central to all of its deliberations, with its major 
role being to give independent advice to Government. This ensures, environmental 
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issues, are taken into account by the Minister, when considering approval for major 
development proposals. 
Significance or the Study. 
The objective of the Em,ironmental Protection Act 1971, and its 1986 successor was 
clearly to protect the environment. This was apparent from the preliminary statements to 
both Acts, and more explicitly stated under sl5 of the 1986 EP Act, which reads 
"it is the objective of the Authority to use its best endeavours-
( a) to protect the environment; and 
(b) to prevent control and abate pollution". 
The effectiveness of any environmental legislation however, depends on a number of 
factors inc1uding the quality of drafting of the Act, the powers given to the 
administrative body and the degree of direct and indirect political control (Hollick, 
1985, p. 116). While the EPA is solely an advisory body its value resides in its complete 
independence from government guaranteed by the Act, which clearly states that the 
Authority cannot be directed by the Minister. Hence, for the Authority to remain 
effective and credible it must be able to provide free independent fearless advice on 
matters concerning the environment. This of course requires the a11ocation of sufficient 
resources necessary to cany out its functions and responsibilities. This degree of 
autonomy is balanced by the Minister not having to accept the Authority's advice, with 
the final decision taken by the elected Government of the day (Johnson, 1988, p. 142). 
The EPA is an independent statutory authority and therefore relies on the Act to 
determine the range and depth of its activities to provide adequate environmental 
protection (Conacher, 1980, p. 53). Changes to the Environmental Protection Act can 
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alter the structure and function of the EPA. Hence the significance of amendments to the 
Act, is that changes can impacl on the EPA's powers and responsibilities. A number of 
additional political factors can also impact on the activities of the EPA. These include 
the composition of the Authority, which the Government can attempt to influence by 
selecting or restricting members of various persuasion (Hollick, 1985, p. 122). The 
EPA's funding is provided entirely by government, which can have a direct impact on 
the ability of the Authority to adequately perform its duties. 
The significance of this study is that it examines the main environmental legislation that 
the EPA derives its powers and responsibi1ities from. lt explores the main achievements 
of the EPA from its inception in 1971 until 1996, the year of the State election. The 
study examines the likely political motives underpinning legislative changes to the 
environmental protection Act, and seeks to establish ideological trends guiding the two 
main parties. The independence of the EPA is considered with an emphasis on the 
relationship between the Department and the Authority, and the degree of direct and 
indirect, Ministerial controL However, it should be noted that the study does not 
incorporate the controversy surrounding the Regional Forest Agreement (RFA). This 
agreement, between the Commonwealth and the Western Australian Government was 
signed in May 1999, but was later modified by the State Government after considerable 
public pressure. 
Problem Under Investigation. 
This thesis focuses on the Western Australian Environmental Protection Authority 
(EPA) which was given broad statutory powers to protect and enhance the environment 
(EPA Annual Report, 1972, p. 9).1ts main role however, is to provide expert advice and 
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recommendations to government on environmental issues. While the EPA acts purely in 
an advisory capacity, its advice is made public which ensures openness and 
accountability (Main, 1991, p. 23). This makes it more difficuh for the Government to 
ignore EPA recommendations, as it would have to make public its reasons for doing so. 
Therefore, a strong Authority can have a significant influence on government decision 
making concerning environmental issues. This study undertakes an evaluation of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1971, the 1980 amendments, the new 1986 Act, and the 
1993 amendments. It seeks to determine 
i) whether the legislative changes have significantly altered the structure and function 
of the EPA, and 
ii) whether these changes have advanced or impaired the EPA's capacity to provide 
adequate environmental advice. 
Hence, the task for this research is to establish if the legislative changes have 
strengthened or weakened the Act and subsequently the EPA. At the beginning of this 
chapter the significant rise of environmentalism was canvassed. Chapter two will focus 
upon the original Environmental Protection Act 1971, as well as the rationale for the 
important 1980 amendments to the same Act. Chapter three undertakes an evaluation of 
the new 1986 EP Act, and highlights some of the improvements and the enhanced role 
for the EPA. Chapter four explores the justification behind the 1993 amendments, and 
the impact of the changes on the EPA. Finally, the main conclusions are presented in 
chapter five, with an overall discussion, and implications of the findings from this study. 
I I 
Chapter Two 
The Environmental Protection Act 1971: Hs strengths and weaknesses. 
The Tonkin Labor Government pursued a rafl of progressive legislation following a 
return to power on 3 May 1971, after 20 years of conservative rule (Kellow and 
Niemeyer, 1999, p. 211). This included !he inlroduclion of !he Environmental 
Protection Act 1971 (EP Act), which was enacted in response to increasing 
environmentaJ awareness in Western Australia. The purpose of the legislation was to 
create an administrative body with the required powers and authority to protect the 
environmenl (WAPD, 23 Seplember 1971, 1737). As a resu!l, !he Environmenlal 
Protection Authority (EPA) was formed as the main administrative body, and given 
widespread powers to protect and enhance the environment. These ranged from "the 
specification of standards and criteria to the publication of model by-laws for adoption 
by local aulhorilies" (WAPD, 23 Sep!ember 1971, p. I 738). The inlen!ion of !he Act as 
stated in the preliminary statement was "for the prevention and control of environmental 
pollu!ion and for !he proleclion and enhancemenl of !he environment"(EP Acl, !971). 
The definition of .. environment" contained in the Act related to "the physical factors 
prevailing in that State .... " Hence, the Act was restricted by its narrow definition of the 
environment to mean a purely 'physica1 environment', rather than a broader definition 
that included the relalionship belween humans and !heir surroundings (Conacher, 1980, 
p.52). 
The broad objeclives of the legislation were sel oul by Premier Tonkin during his 
second reading speech (WAPD, 23 Seplember 197 I, p. I 737), and were res!aled in !he 
EPA's first Annual Report (1972, p. 8) as foJiows; 
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• Enable positive action to be taken to control environmental degradation. 
• Establish environmental protection policies that will set acceptable standards 
now and for the future. 
• Invoke public opinion where necessary, and 
• Provide avenues of appeal in appropriate cases. 
However, there were a number of deficiencies in the 1971 Act that reduced the power 
and influence of the EPA. The most obvious were the ambiguity surrounding the 
requirements for environmental protection policies (EPPs), and the inadequate 
definition of pollution contained in the Act. Consequently, the EPA's role was restricted 
to providing independent advice to the Minister (Main, 1988, p. 135). Indeed, Hollick 
(1985, p. !16) has argued that there are many reasons why the practical implementation 
of environmental management may vary significantly from the intent of the legislation. 
These include weaknesses in drafting the Act, the powers given to the administrative 
body, the interpretation of its role and responsibility, and the degree of direct and 
indirect political control. While providing innovative legislation for its time the 1971 EP 
Act was weakened by a combination of these influences. 
Structure of the Environmental Protection Bodies. 
In addition to the EPA, the legislation provided for a fourteen member Environmental 
Protection Council to assist and provide specialist advice to the Authority. In order to 
delineate between roles the Authority was the executive body while the Council was an 
advisory body. However, the Council was not intended to be subservient to the 
Authority and could suhmit its recommendations directly to the Minister (WAPD, 23 
September 1971, p. 1738). An Environmental Appeal Board was established to hear 
appeals against a proposed policy prior to its proclamation. Finally, the Department of 
13 
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Environmental Protection was set up within the Public Service, under the direction of 
the EPA (WAPD, 23 September 1971, p. 1739). The role of the Department was to 
provide research, investigative and administrative support to the Authority. It acted as a 
first point of contact for general inquiries and could resolve problems not requiring 
executive consideration (EPA Annual Report, 1972, p. I 1). Under the 1971 EP Act, the 
Chairman of the EPA was also the Director of the Department. This was to become the 
most contentious part of the legislation with the major parties taking ideologically 
opposed positions on the issue of the respective heads of the Department and the EPA. 
The Coalition Opposition, while supporting the need for environmental legislation, 
expressed concern with the cumbersome organisational aspects of the BiB and 
questioned the need for ali the environmental bodies. It preferred a more educational 
approach to environmental protection and opposed an all powerful Authority that could 
delay government policy and subsequently industrial development (WAPD, 7 October 
1971, p. 1984). On the other hand, the Labor Government specifically designed the 
legislation to balance the powers and independence of the EPA, with the responsibility 
of government. This was achieved by retaining Cabinet's constitutional obligations, 
with the Authority fulfilling the role of environmental watchdog (W APD, 23 September 
1971, p. 1739). Hence the elected government of the day had the benefit of independent 
advice, but ultimately made the final decision on environmental issues. These decisions 
can be made more difficult with the publication of the Authority's findings. However 
the 1971 EP Act, failed to specifically require the Authority to publish its 
recommendations although it could, if it so chose. This was a significant weakness in 
the legislation, which reduced the power of the EPA (Conacher, 1980, p. 54). 
Consequently, the extent of the Authority's influence in environmental management 
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under the original legislation largely depended on the commitment of the Government to 
accept and implementing its advice. 
The commitment of the Tonkin Labor Government to its own legislation and the new 
environmental body was tested early with two controversial projects. Parliament had 
passed an Agreement Act for setting up the Pacminex alumina refinery in the Upper 
Swan region, subject to an EPA environmental report. The EPA recommended against 
proposals for the refinery because of concerns over air pollution, and the danger of 
impurities leaking into the underground water system (0' Brien, 1978, p. 44). The 
Government accepted the EPA's advice and arrangements had to be made for a new site. 
This was an important landmark decision by the EPA, as the Gnangara Mound has 
subsequently been relied upon to supply part of Perth's domestic water. However, many 
•' 
within industry and government bureaucracies were taken completely by surprise, and 
had to come to terms with a new environmental body that Premier Tonkin promised 
would have "teeth" (WAPD, 23 September 1971, p. 1739). Moreover, the Government's 
decision to accept the EPA recommendation caused disquiet within its own ranks, as the 
refinery would have contributed 190 million dollars to the economy. In particular, it 
denied the new, Minister for Development and Decentralisation, Herbert Graham an 
early industrial development trophy (The West Australian, 20 October, 1972, p. 20). 
Another controversial issue that arose early in the life of the EPA was the so called 
Fitzgerald River Reserve. This was a C class Reserve in the South West where a mining 
company wanted to explore for coal. Conservationists, however, vehemently opposed 
the granting of exploration licences in the belief that extensive open-cut mining would 
be permitted if the proposition proved viable. To resolve the issue, the EPA went 
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against standard procedure and recommended that public money be spent on drilling, to 
detennine the viability of mining coal reserves (O'Brien, 1991, p. 9). The Government 
accepted the recommendation and the resulting coal deposit was much lower than 
expected. The consequence of this decision was the loss of investment interest by the 
mining company. Moreover, the Government later accepted an EPA recommendation 
that the reserve be upgraded to a Class A national park, which required an Act of 
Parliament to sanction future mining in that area of the South West (EPA Annual 
Report, 1973, p. 31). Despite widespread criticism, the EPA showed within months the 
beneficial impact of its recommendations upon future generations. 
These achievements were backed up with the Authority's profound belief in the 
importance of public awareness and participation in environmental management. This 
ensured openness and accountabiJity, which led to increased public knowledge on 
environmental issues (Main, 1991, p. 23). The role of the public is an integral part of 
environmental protection in Western Australia and was clearly set out in the 1971 EP 
Act. As a result, the EPA established a Committee for Understanding the Environment, 
made up from a group of private citizens to ensure public participation. One of its most 
notable initiatives was the setting up of a library in the Department of Environmental 
Protection. This provided access to the public and an important avenue for those 
requiring specific research material (EPA Annual Report, 1973, p. 10). Hence one of the 
EPA's main early achievements was its continuous contribution to greater public 
awareness in environmental management. 
Another significant achievement by the EPA was its contribution to the preservation of 
large areas of reserves in Western Australia. The EPA at its very first meeting set up the 
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Conservation Through Reserves Commiuee (CTRC) whose task was to determine what 
areas of the State, should be set aside for National Parks and Nature Reserves. h divided 
the State into 12 parts or systems where it could concentrate on land utilisation within 
that area (0' Brien, 1991, p. 9). The important work of the CTRC can be examined in 
detail through its publications in the Red and Green Books, but can also be enjoyed by 
current and future generations in a whole range of leisure activities, and aesthetic 
qualities that could easily have been lostthr.,ugh development (Mulcahy, 1991, p. 67). 
This was a considerable study that extended over ten years, and the EPA decided from 
the outset to access the most difficult and contentious area surrounding Perth and 
Bunbury, known as Systems 6 last. The Authority reported in 1977 that significant 
progress was occurring with the Coalition Government having accepted 275 
recommendations by the CTRC, for ten of the twelve systems (EPA Annual Report, 
1976-77, p. 13). There were delays however, in implementing some of the Red Book 
recommendations because of disputes involving mining boundaries. However, the most 
comJ:. iehensive land-use study ever undertaken in Western Australia was completed in 
1983, with the final CTRC recommendation endorsed by the Labor Government in 
1984. 
Deliciencies in the Environmental Protection Actl97l. 
Notwithstanding these early achievements there were a number of reasons why the 
Authority's powers and influence had been restricted. This was evident for example in 
the area of formulating environmental protection policies (EPPs) for the Stale, which 
according to Premier Tonkin (W APD, 23 September 1971, p. 1738) was one of the most 
important functions of the EPA. However despite the intention of the legislation no 
EPPs were prepared by the EPA under the 1971 EP Act. This enterprise did not 
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commence until it was replaced with the Environmental Protection Act 1986 (Cox, 
1994, p. 307). This was partly due to a weakness in drafling which stipulated under 
Section 35 and 36 that all policy proposals must be advertised in three issues of a daily 
newspaper and the Government Gazette. This was interpreted to mean that the entire 
policy proposal must be published. Surprisingly, this view was never challenged by the 
Authority (Hollick, 1985, p. 118, 120). Consequently, the EPA missed an opportunity to 
establish a more diret.::t role for itself in environmental management by not initiating 
draft EPPs in the early years. Further deficiencies in the 1971 Act can be highlighted 
with the legislation failing to provide the Authority with the necessary powers to address 
a significant environmental issue such as salinity. 
In 1973 the EPA raised concerns about the possibility of increased saJinity, from the 
clearing of vegetation in agricultural and mining regions (EPA Annual Report, 1973-74, 
p. 16). Salinity is caused by removing deep-rooted perennial, native vegetation which 
draws on underground water supplies, keeping levels down and preventing salt from 
rising to the surface. In 1974 the Wellington Dam reservoir in the South West was 
becoming salty, and the EPA was asked by the relevant water authorities to impose land 
clearing bans in the major catchments and surrounding areas. However, "the Authority 
had no power to act because salinity caused by clearing land did not fall under the 
definition of pollution", contained in the Act (Main, 1991, p. 21). Instead the EPA 
recommended that Parliament consider legislation to control land clearing (EPA Annual 
Report, 1974-75, p. 15). Despite some restrictions placed on land clearing for water 
catchments, successive governments failed to grasp the extent of the salinity problem 
throughout the State and did not respond with adequate legislation. The extent of the 
problem was highlighted in the 1998 State of the Environment Report, which placed 
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salinity among Western Australia's most significant environmental issue requiring 
enonnous expense to resolve. Yet despite EPA concerns in 1973, and subsequently, lt-tnd 
clearing continued on a massive scale until the early 1990s. The emergence of the 
salinity problem illustrated the lack of EPA power and influence on such an important 
environmental issue in Western Australia. 
The 1971 EP Act provided the EPA with power to recommend restriction or cessation 
of activities causing poliution, with resulting penalties for convictions. However, the 
EPA were again restricted by a major flaw in the Act which faiJed specifically to express 
pollution as an offence (Hollick, 1985, p. 117). This deficiency in the legislation may 
have contributed to the EPA's reluctance to pursue prosecutions. Moreover, the Act 
provided the administrative body with discretionary powers rather than specific duties. 
This aUowed the EPA to ignore certain aspects of the Act and shape the legislation to 
suit its particular brand of philosophy (Hollick, 1985, p. 119). For example the EPA 
acknowledged it could not look to guiding precedents, and from the outset made a 
conscious decision to adopt a collaborative informative approach rather than a 
regulatory approach to pollution control (EPA Annual Report, 1972, p. 9). Hence a 
weakness in drafting combined with the Authority's interpretation of the legislation has 
significantly reduced the power and influence of the EPA. 
An Evolving Approach to Environmental Impact Procedures. 
While in some cases the EPA chose to ignore or interpret the legislation in a narrow 
sense, in others it had been forced to apply a much broader interpretation to give it a 
greater influence in environmental management. This was evident with the evolving 
approach to environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedures, which were adopted 
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much later in Western Australia th;u1 in the other States. This delay was largely 
innucnced by lhe philosophy of the EPA, under the direction of its Chairman Dr Brian 
0' Brien (Fowler, 1982, p. 65). In the early years the EPA opposed the need for a highly 
formalised requirement for each developmcnl proposal and preferred an ad hoc 
approach. For example, in 1973 the EPA warned against elevating environmental 
impact statements (EIS) as a cure for all environmental problems, and suggested they 
were just another tool in the complex area of environmental management (EPA Annual 
Report, 1973, p. 5; 0' Brien, 1976, p. 265). 
However, political pressure was mounting on the State Government, with the possibility 
of mandatory requirements of EIS for projects involving Commonwealth funds and 
constitutional powers. This resulted in an agreement in 1977 between the Federal and 
Western Australian State Government, for joint arrangements on environmental impact 
assessment (Conacher, 1980, p. 51; EPA, Annual Report, 1976-77, p. 19). This 
evolution of events required the Authority to change its attitude on impact assessment, 
yet there was no specific reference lo EIA in the 1971 EP Act. Hence the EPA in this 
instance had to apply a wider interpretation of the legislation to include environmental 
assessment procedures. This was achieved by using Section 57 (I) of I he Act, which 
slated 
Where il comes lo the notice of a Minister of the Crown !hal. a proposed 
development, project, industry, or other thing, may have a detrimental effect 
on ihe environment he shall so advise the Authority and shall thereafter in 
relation to !hal maller furnish to the Authority and .lo lhe Council all such 
aid, infonnation and facilities as are practicable and the Authority shall 
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report to the Minister on the matter when and as often as the Minister 
requires. 
In practice the EPA gained acceptance for EIA by insisting that it could not advise the 
Minister without more detailed information on the development proposal, but this was 
achieved without specific statutory backing. Moreover, the earlier preference for an ad 
hoc approach to environmental impact assessment led to a unique set of circumstances 
in Western Australia. 
Western Australia did not adopt the same EIA procedures as the other States but chose a 
system similar to the Commonwealth approach to EIS. The highest level of assessment 
was referred to as an environmental review and management programme (ERMP) which 
was undertaken by the developer and submitted to the EPA for assessment (DCE, 1978, 
p. 3). The EPA experienced its first change in membership in 1977, with the retirement 
of Brian 0' Brien after serving seven years as chairman. He was replaced by Colin 
Porter who was appointed chairman of the EPA. Porter was a hydraulics research 
engineer, who gained international recognition for cleaning up the Thames and restoring 
the Salmon fish stock after 120 years of uncontrolled pollution (Harris, 1986, p. 9). As 
chairman of the EPA, Porter inherited the responsibility for implementing the new EIA 
requirements for development proposals, and was faced with the added burden of a 
worldwide recession. Consequently, pressure was applied from various quarters for the 
relaxation of environmental standards due to the economic downturn. At least in an 
official response, as indicated in the 1977-78 Annual Report, the EPA contended that 
over the long term, environmental protection is less costly to the public than 
environmental correction (EPA Annual Report, 1977-78, p. 5). Furthermore, the new 
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EIA requirements for development proposals were unlikely to reduce the conflict 
between developers and conservationists. 
The conflict between development and conservation was highlighted with proposals for 
an expansion of bauxite mining in different parts of the State. As a result of the new EIA 
arrangements, AJcoa of Australia and Alwest Pty Ldt. were among the first companies 
required to meet the new assessment procedures. Alcoa submitted an ERMP for its 
Wagerup Alumina refinery in the Darling Range, which the EPA released in May 1978 
for public review. According to the EPA Annual Report, (1978-79, p. 21) this was the 
most difficult and complex task before the EPA since its formation. The mining lease 
covered an area containing much of the Northern Jarrah Forest, which had high 
conservation value, and was important for water catchment. The EPA recommended 
that the alumina refinery could be allowed, subject to a list of specifications (EPA 
Annual Report, 1978-79 p. 21). This was accepted by the Government, and the company 
was required to submit a new ERMP that met the criteria, with the proposal finally 
gaining approval in October 1978. 
However, Alwest were experiencing even greater difficulty producing a satisfactory 
ERMP for its Worsley Alumina refinery. It took three attempts before the Authority 
considered that the ERMP was suitable for public review. Following extensive 
discussions between the company and a number of government bodies, the EPA 
submitted its report and recommendations on the Worsley proposal to the Minister for 
Industrial Development in March 1979 (EPA Annual Report, 1978-79, p. 22). The 
proposal was unsatisfactory and the company was requested to submit another draft 
ERMP to the EPA in July 1979, which was still deficient in a number of areas. The final 
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ERMP was referred to the EPA in October 1979, and after consideration the Authority 
advised the Minister against approving the proposal on environmental grounds. 
However, in a press release on 28 November 1979, Premier Court stated, "that on the 
basis of the final ERMP both the Commonwealth and State environmental authorities 
had recommended that the project could proceed" (Arthur and Coyle, 1980, p. I). 
Hence, in a reminder that the EPA had only an advisory role, the Coalition Government, 
Jed by Sir Charles Court decided that the proposal could proceed on the basis of 
assurances provided by the company. 
The Coalition Government was faced with increasing poJitical pressure following its 
decision to grant approval for the Worsley project. This pressure came from various 
conservation groups, the press, and the Labor opposition. The main area of contention 
was not so much that the Government granted approval, but that it gave the impression 
the project had the full backing of the EPA (Arthur and Coyle, 1980, p. 1). The 
Opposition Leader Ron Davies called the situation exceedingly grave and demanded a 
full disclosure of all documents between the Government and the EPA. An editorial in 
The West Australian on 19 January 1980 strongly criticised Premier Charles Court, for 
failing to make public the EPA's concerns over the Worsley project. It argued, that the 
recent events "makes a mockery of the principle of public review of environmentally 
sensitive projects, and leaves the Government open to accusations that it is selective in 
the information it is willing to release to the public" (The West Australian, 19 January 
1980, p. 6). Moreover, the editorial stated that the public was entitled to an explanation, 
and that at least on the face of it, Premier Charles Court had made a misleading 
statement. Under intense scrutiny in Parliament the Government finally admitted that its 
authorisation for the Worsley alumina proposal, contrasted with the Authority's 
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recommendations, and gave no adequate explanation for its earlier announcement that 
the project enjoyed EPA approval (Wall, 1980, p. 443). 
Subsequently, political pressure intensified when it became known that the Government 
intended to review the legislation governing the EPA. It was widely reported that the 
Government was unhappy with the direction of the EPA under the leadership of its 
Chairman Colin Porter (The West Australian, 21 October 1980, p. 3). This led to 
considerable speculation in the media about the proposed changes to the 1971 EP Act. 
In addition to proposals to remove the Chairman from the EPA it was reported that 
re~~onsibility for ERMPs would be transferred to the Department of Resources 
Development. However, when the legislation came before Parliament it was less 
draconian than anticipated which led many to assume that the Government had 
responded to growing political pressure and changed its original intentions (Penrose, 
1981, p. 93). 
The 1980 Amendments to the Environmental Protection Act 1971. 
The 1980 amendments, however, were still the most significant change to the 1971 EP 
Act since its formation, and resulted in the separation of the roles of Chairman of the 
Authority and Director of the Department. The changes were widely viewed as 
politically motivated and a clear attempt to weaken the Authority (Penrose, 1981, p. 93). 
Environmental groups were extremely critical of the changes with both the Australian 
and the Western Australian Conservation Council's, expressing alarm at the 
Government's attack on the independence of the EPA (The West Australian, 22 October 
1980, p. 4). The Labor Opposition objected to the Bill on three main grounds, and 
claimed that the amendments weakened the EPA by "sacking the director of the 
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depanment from the chairmanship of both the EPA and the Environmental Protection 
Council" (WAPD, 20 November 1980, p. 3808). It objected to the restrictions placed on 
the EPA to publish its recommendations and the potential for greater interference by the 
Minister for Conservation and Environment in the EPA (WAPD, 20 November 1980, p. 
3813). These views were backed up by one of Australia's most distinguished public 
servants, Dr 'Nugget' Coombs. He criticised the change to the structure of the EPA and 
said, ''that the removal of Colin Poner as chairman of the EPA was a retrograde step and 
was vinually placing him under direct ministerial control" (Anhur, 1980, p. 2). 
The Coalition Government, however, argued that the amendments would streamline and 
strengthen the EPA and would not require one person having to continually change 
roles. As Deputy Premier Ray 0' Connor stated, "the W A Government wanted to make 
the EPA a more independent environmental watchdog" (The West Australian, 14 
November 1980, p. 5). Under the original Act the Chairman would provide independent 
advice to the Government, and then the same person would take orders from the 
Minister while Director of the Depanment (WAPD, 13 November 1980, p. 3520). 
However, the Government's reasons for introducing the changes lacked conviction, 
which was highlighted by its failure to act on these concerns at an earlier date. This was 
demonstrated by Labor MLA for Rockingham, Mike Barnett during the second reading 
debate when he stated that " the EPA has worked well over the last nine years and this 
has been proved by the fact the Coalition Government has been in power for six of those 
nine years and has not seen fit to change the Act substantially" (W APD, 20 November 
1980, p. 3811). The Labor member for Morley, Arthur Tonkin, stated that the reason for 
the amendments was to remove Colin Poner from the EPA, "because Mr Poner had 
been a thorn in the side of this Government" (W APD, 20 November 1980, p. 3819). 
25 
Hence the amendments were clearly designed to avoid Government embarrassment and 
further curtail the limited power and influence of the EPA. 
Conclusion. 
The 1971 EP Act provided a starting point for environmental protection in Western 
Australia. It was inadequate in a number of areas and failed to give the EPA any real 
power. As a result the EPA could only make recommendations to government (Hollick, 
1985, p.l21; Main, 1988 p. 135). The lack of specific powers may have helped persuade 
the Authority members to pursue a more educative approach to environmental 
management. This approach played an important contribution in increasing public 
awareness and helped ensure environmental concerns were considered for new 
development proposals (Main, 1991, p. 22). There were a number of weaknesses with 
the drafting of the legislation that were inconsistent with its intentions, which further 
restricted the influence of the EPA. These included the areas dealing with the 
formulation of environmental protection policies, and pollution control. Clearly the 
influence of the EPA was enhanced with the acceptance of environmental assessment 
procedures, but this was achieved without adequate statutory backing. Of course the 
structure and function of the EPA was directly affected by the Coalition Government's 
amendments in 1980 (W APD, 13 November 1980, p. 3519). The splitting of the 
Authority from the Department was clearly designed to reduce the influence of the EPA. 
At the same time the restriction on publishing the Authority's recommendations was an 
attempt to avoid government embarrassment when it made a decision contrary to EPA 
approval. This illustrated the lack of political commitment to environmental 
management, and the failure to provide effective legislation to strengthen the EPA in 
Western Australia. 
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Chapter Three 
An Evaluation or the Environmental Protection Actl986. 
The environment was a significant issue on the political agenda throughout Australia in 
the early 1980s, and it involved mainly disputes over wilderness conservation and antiw 
logging campaigns. The I 982-83 campaign against the 'Gordon-below-Franklin' Hydro-
Electric Commission scheme in Tasmania was the most prominent (Pakulski, Tranter 
and Crook, 1998). During the 1983 election campaign in Western Australia the Labor 
Party promised to improve the environmental impact assessment procedures, which 
were deficient in a number of areas. Part of its policy called for a system that included a 
cost-benefit analysis that took account of environmental as well as economic factors. At 
a public seminar held on environmental impact assessment and procedures (DCE, 1983, 
p. 7), Premier Burke outlined four areas of the Act under review, which were stated as 
follows; 
• the composition and duties of the Environmental Protection Authority 
• the procedures under which the EPA operates 
• the role of pubJic participation in environmental decision-making, and 
• pollution control measures 
In his opening address the Premier spoke about the evolution of environmental 
assessment procedures in Western Australia. He highlighted some of the uncertainties 
stemming from the absence of specific legislation in certain areas that needed to be 
addressed. These included requirements for reports to be published, and legitimate 
access for public involvement in the assessment process. Premier Burke indicated that 
his Government would consider statutory backing for environmental impact assessment 
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(EIA) procedures, to provide greater certainty for developers and the community (DCE, 
1983, p. 8). There were wide ranging views canvassed at the public seminar with 
support for and against stronger measures, which indicated the difficulties the 
Government faced in achieving consensus for legislative change. 
Criticisms of the EPA and {iovemment inaction over legislative change. 
Upon gaining office the Labor Government were even more critical of the 1971 EP Act, 
with the new Environment Minister Ron Davies describing it as the "worst 
environmental legislation in Australia" (Barker, 1983, p. 9). He said that it was 
unenforceable in a number of areas and would not stand up to legal scrutiny. 
Consequently. the Burke Government announced soon after the election that it would 
review the Environmental Protection Act 1971, including the area dealing with 
environmental assessments. The conflict between conservation and development 
increased in the early to mid 1980s, with a series of campaigns against a number of 
America's Cup projects. The Scarborough Ratepayers Association criticised the EPA for 
its efforts in producing only a two-page report on the Austmark Observation City 
project. However, in the report the EPA stated that the objections raised, related more to 
the social rather than the natural environment (Treweek, 1984, p. 15). 
Criticism of the EPA intensified, when a spokesperson for the Sorrento marina 
watchdog committee, questioned the value of an independent body that could not make 
its recommendations stick with Government. During the controversy over the Farrington 
road extension near North Lake, a resident's group claimed that their submission to the 
EPA was not even considered. Moreover, the Conservation Council was extremely 
critical of the EPA, when it reversed its decision that an environmental review and 
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management programme (ERMP) was required for the Burswood Island casino. It 
accused the government of overriding the public right to participate in environmental 
procedures in its eagemess to pursue development projects for the America's Cup (The 
West Australian, 5 March I 985, p. 58). While these criticisms were mainly directed 
towards the EPA they emphasised the deficiencies in the 1971 EP Act, and highlighted 
the Labor Government's inaction in implementing legislative change. 
In 1985, administrative changes occurred within the EPA when its Chairman Professor 
Main, retired after fourteen years service. He was replaced by Barry Carbon who vowed 
to continue the Authority's role and objectives, by providing informed advice on the 
environment while attempting to strike a balance between conservation and 
development. Carbon, had been a senior executive with the mining company Alcoa and 
as a result, his appointment was strong1y criticised by conservationists (The West 
Australian, 3 April 1985, p. 4). However, these concerns were eased by his commitment 
to improve environmental legislation in Western Australia. 
The significance of legislative changes to the I 971 EP Act, on the role of the EPA were 
illustrated by the new EPA chairman, who emphasised the need to "cement the 
foundation" of the preceding work done by the former members before it eroded. As 
Carbon stated, "The EPA will be recommending to Government on legislative changes 
which will formalise some of the existing practice and procedures of environmental 
assessment" (EPA Annual Report, 1984-85, p. 4). This was an important undertaking 
that ensured continuity, by providing statutory backing to the existing functions 
performed by the EPA, some of which had been adopted informally but were necessary 
to meet increased demands. 
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Meanwhile, the Environment Minister Ron Davies was having difficulty preparing the 
new legislation, as there was opposition from all sides. Premier Burke felt change was 
needed and appointed Barry Hodge, who had to resolve an urgent issue before he was 
sworn in as Minister for the Environment. The amendments carried out in 1980 to split 
the Department from the Authority were causing problems. There were conflicting 
views between the Chainnan Barry Carbon and the Director of the Department Colin 
Porter, who were competing for the same resources. According lo Hodge (1991, p. 98) 
the two men were excellent, dedicated people, but the arrangement was simply not 
working. The personalities combined with deficient legislation about the arrangements 
for the two roles proved impracticable. Hence the new Minister in consultation with his 
Cabinet colleagues, decided to place Carbon as Director of the Department, as well as 
Chainnan of the EPA. 
This was a return to the existing arrangement of the combined role under the original 
1971 EP Act In an interview after his resignation in March 1986, Colin Porter admitled 
he was upset al the time of !he chang., in !980, which in his view was an atlempl to 
weaken lhe EPA. However, he questioned the magnitude of the task for one person to 
handle lhe dual roles, and staled !hal "the real trouble was !hal no government has 
decided what it wants lhe EPA lo do" (Harris, 1986, p. 9). Porter said, !hal the 
Government must decide whether il wanted an independent body outside the public 
service, or a traditionally oriented organisation. Following !he appointment of a new 
Minister and after a delay of three years, the Burke Labor Government finally gave 
priority to bringing about !he necessary legislalive changes to lhe 1971 EP Acl. 
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The Introduction of the Environmental Protection Act1986. 
The Environmemal Protection Act1986 was introduced into Parliament, after extensive 
consultation with the EPA, conservation groups, developers and community members. It 
was proclaimed on 20 February 1987, and with the accompanying Repeal Act, replaced 
the 1971 EP Act and repealed the Clean Air Act 1964-1985, parts of the Noise 
Abatement Act 1972 and Part ill A (Control of Pollution) of the Rights in Water and 
Irrigation Act 1914-1985 (EPA, 1987, p. 1). The Government sought to strengthen and 
modernise the new 1986 EP Act to bring it more into line with environmental demands, 
arising from population growth and development (W APD, 24 July 1986, p. 2537). The 
Bill provided for an expansion of the EPA to five members, which extended its level of 
experience and expertise (EPA Annual Report, 1986-87, p. 7). The new Act increased 
the power and influence of the EPA with a broader definition of the environment to 
cover wider social aspects, including aesthetic, cultural, economic and social 
surroundings (Bache, Bailey and Evans, 1996, p. 487). However, these were qualified 
under Subsection 2, to the extent that they must directly affect or be directly affected by 
humanity's physical or biological surroundings. 
In addition, the 1986 EP Act provided the EPA with three statutory measures which 
enhanced its ability to cany out its functions, and increased its power and influence in 
environmental management (Singleton, 1992, p. 35; Bailey and English, 1991, p. 191). 
These were an improvement in environmental protection policy (EPP) procedures 
contained in Pt ill, the formalisation of EIA requirements in Pt N, and pollution control 
measures in Pt V with enforcement provisions in Pt VI. The new Act provided for a 
more central role for the Minister of the Environment. The Minister now had the power 
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to set environmental conditions for all proposals, some of which were previously carried 
out by other Ministers (EPA Annual Reports, 1986-87, p. 7). 
An important element of the 1986 Act that further enhanced the power and influence of 
the EPA was the primacy given to the EP Act over the majority of Western Australian 
statutes, Section (5). The independence of the EPA from Ministerial direction was 
guaranteed on all but a small number of procedural matters (EP Act 1986, Section 8). 
Moreover, the legislation clarified the structure of the EPA, with the Chairman of the 
Authority given the additional function of Chief Executive Officer of the Department. 
Hence, the capacity for the Authority to coordinate and carry out a wide range of 
functions was strengthened by merging the staff of the Department and Conservation 
and Environment into the EPA. This ensured the necessary resources were provided for 
the Authority to carry out its duties and implement its policies (W APD, 24 July 1986, p. 
2539; Bache, 1998, p. 160). 
The Coalition Opposition questioned the need to rewrite the legislation, and maintained 
its resistance against the realignment of the Authority and the Department. There has 
been a consistent ideological difference between the two main parties, on the issue of 
the respective heads of the Department and the EPA. The Liberal Party expressed 
concern with the original 1971 EP Act, it introduced legislation in 1980 to separate the 
combined roles and it opposed this aspect of the 1986 EP Act (W APD, 16 October 
1986, p. 3182). However, there has been no evidence to support the ideological stance 
against the combined role. ht fact Barry Blaikie, Liberal MLA for Vasse, continued to 
quote extensively from the tribute to Professor Main acknowledging his contribution 
and stating the high degree of public confidence in the EPA over the fourteen years 
(WAPD, 16 October 1986, p. 3182). While he may have been referring to the period 
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when Main was chairman, it should be noted that the combined roles were operative 
during the majority of the fourteen years, which does not necessarily support the 
argument against realignment of the EPA and the Depanment. 
Enhanced Statutory Functions. 
One major flaw in the 1971 EP Act was that it was vague and inadequate in the area of 
pollution control. While it allocated broad powers to the EPA to monitor waste 
discharge and carry out inspections, the act however failed to specify pollution as an 
offence (Hollick, 1985, p.ll7). Moreover, pollution control powers were contained 
throughout a number of Statutes, which increased complexity and made prosecutions 
extremely difficult. Hence pollution control was consolidated into the new 1986 EP Act 
and became the responsibility of the Authority, with regulation tasks delegated to 
appropriate management agencies, subject to specified conditions (W APD, 24 July 
1986, p. 2538). While the Act ensured the independence of the EPA and its Chairman 
from Ministerial direction, an exemption was granted under Section 8 (b) which stated 
"except when acting in his capacity as the Chief Executive Officer". This was 
particularly relevant for pollution control which involved coercive measures 
administered by the Chief Executive Officer, subject to direction by the Minister (EPA 
Annual Repon, 1986-87, p. 7). Consequently, the Opposition expressed concern with 
the pollution contrOl aspects of the Bill and argued "that this introduces a potential 
conflict between the EPA's advisory and policeman roles" (WAPD, 16 October 1986, p. 
3177). 
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The intention of the 1986 EP Act was to encompass a broad range of activities .that 
could hann the environment. Therefore, Section 3 defines pollution as direct or indirect 
alteration of the environment, 
(a) to its detriment or degradation; 
(b) to the detriment of any beneficial use; or 
(c) of a prescribed kind. 
The definition while appearing broad was restricted somewhat as a result of an appeal 
action in the Supreme Court in 1991 (Browne-Cooper, 1997, p. 169). The case of Palos 
Verdes Estates Pty Ldt v Carbon involved a conviction against the company for 
unauthorised clearing of bushland. The Supreme Court upheld the appeal on the basis 
that section 49 (I) was ambiguous, and that the definition of pollution was so broad as 
to be unworkable. The leading judgement was delivered by Chief Justice David 
Malcolm, who deemed it·necessary, to revert to the dictionary definition of "pollution .. , 
to make foul or unclean. Using this interpretation, Malcolm held that land clearing fell 
outside the definition of pollution (Readhead, 1991, p. 3). Despite immediate attempts 
to introduce an amendment to cover the concept of "unauthorised environmental 
degradation", the Bill was never proceeded with (Browne-Cooper, 1997, p. 169). 
Consequently, for pollution to cause an offence in Western Australia it must not only 
degrade the environment, but must also make the environment foul or unclean. As a 
result, the decision handed down by the Supreme Court, cast doubt on the scope of the 
pollution control powers, and illustrated the discrepancy between the apparent intent of 
the legislation and its interpretation. 
The 1986 Act specifically addressed the ambiguities surrounding environmental 
protection policies (EPPs) in the 1971 EP Act by providing greater clarity. The 
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deficiencies in the 1971 Act prevented the Authority from preparing any EPPs during 
the entire period of the original legislation. Under the new 1986 EP Act the EPA was 
able to use EPPs to protect any portion of the environment or to prevent, control or 
abate pollution (EP Act 1986, s 26). EPPs were considered an appropriate tool to 
address the cumulative impacts of development, and were therefore more beneficial for 
particular environmental issues than EIA or poiJution control measures (Cox, 1994, p. 
307). The Act provided detailed criteria for the preparation of draft EPPs including 
publication and increased availability of draft documents, with greater opportunity for 
pubic involvement (s 26-31 ). Once an EPP has been approved by the Minister and has 
not been disallowed by Parliament it has the force of law as though it were part of the 
Act (EPA 1987, p. 3). Hence EPPs once implemented are among the most direct means 
of providing environmental protection. 
The firSt EPP developed and impleiT'-· '1Led under the new Act, related to the control of 
sulphur dioxide emissions from the gold and nickel processing plants in Kalgoorlie 
(EPA Annual Report, 1987-88, p. 7). Moreover, there were seven EPPs established by 
the EPA between 1987 and 1993 (Cox, 1994, p. 307). This was an improvement from 
the original legislation, which increased the potential use of EPPs and provided the EPA 
with a more direct capacity to influence environmental protection in Western Australia. 
However, despite the improvement, conservations groups expressed concern with the 
limited number of EPPs developed by the EPA, since the proclamation of the new 1986 
EP Act. Indeed Singleton ( 1992, p. 36) advocated two possible reasons for this, namely 
legal uncertainty of what constiwtes a statutory EPP, and a greater emphasis by the EPA 
towards pollution control and EIA procedures. 
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New Requirements for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). 
The 1986 EP Act fonnalised the system of environmental assessment in Western 
Australia by providing statutory backing for EIA procedures. This was a clear objective 
of the legislation, which sought to consolidate the Authority's evolved practice on 
environmental assessment. The 1986 EP Act provided the EPA with specific powers to 
administer EIA, which were balanced against detaiJed accountability provisions (Bailey 
and English, 1991, p. 191 ). These powers include inter alia, a compulsory referral of all 
relevant proposals; decision making is suspended until the EIA process has been 
completed; and the advice provided to the Minister for the Environment by the EPA 
must be published. The accountability provisions include, a public right to appeal on the 
procedures applied; a public right to appeal against the advice given by the EPA to the 
Minister, prior to the decision being made; and public notification must occur at 
specified stages of the EJA process (Bailey and English, 1991, p. 191, 192). 
Public· involvement was- enhanced under section 38, which states, "a proposal that 
appears likely, if implemented, to have a significant effect on the environment" may be 
referred to the EPA by a proponent or any other person for assessment (Bates, 1995, p. 
168). In 1989, a Social hnpact Unit (SW) was created to address the social, economic 
and quality of life issues outside the EPA's legislative framework. This was a direct 
response to the increased number of issues raised by the public concerning proposals. 
The unit was part of the Department of State Development, but worked closely with the 
EPA to assess the social acceptability of development proposals (Bailey and English, 
1991, p. 192). 
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However, the decision whether to assess a proposal and at what level is made by the 
Authority. The broad definitions of "propo:;al" and "environment" in the Act means that 
the level of assessment is largely determined by the Authority's interpretation of 
"environmental significance" (Sippe, 1987, p. 4). As a result, there are a number of 
options for dealing with proposals and different levels of assessment. The EPA may 
• decide the proposal does not require assessment. 
• assess it "in house" and provide public advice (known as Informal Review 
with public advice); 
• issue a Works Approval and/or Licence; or 
• assess it "formally through a Consultative Environmental Review, Public 
Environmental Review, or at the highest level Environmental Review and 
Management Programme (ERMP) (Carew-Hopkins, 1997, p. 191). See 
(Bailey and English, 19'91, for more detail on different levels of assessment 
and for an overview of EIA procedures in Western Australia). 
Hence the 1986 Act increased the extent of EPA influence in development proposals 
through EIA, but allowed for extensive flexibility in its administration. This in effect 
ensured development proposals could proceed provided proponents incorporated 
environmental impacts into their overall management plan. 
The efforts of the EPA in evolving the earlier ad hoc approach combined with the new 
legislative arrangements has resulted in an assessment system that enhances 
environmental protection. Increased public awareness coupled with greater clarity in the 
1986 Act has substantially increased proposals for EPA assessment. According to the 
EPA Annual Report (1986-87, p. 11) over 900 proposals were referred to the Authority 
for assessment during that year. The new arrangements for EIA encouraged proponents 
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to include long term environmental impacts during the planning stage, with a greater 
emphasis on anticipation (EPA Annual Report, 1987-88, p.l ). However, this frustrated 
some developers who were critical of a powerful EPA, which in their view delayed 
development. For example, the Australian Association of Planning Consultants (AAPC) 
were extremely critical of the powers contained in the ! 986 liP Act. The AAPC argued 
that the Act gave the EPA and the Minister for the Environment the power to halt 
developments even though they complied with town planning schemes (Waddacor, 
1988, p. II). 
The Environment Minister Barry Hodge responded by highlighting the requirements for 
impact assessment under the previous 1971 EP Act, which also called upon the Minister 
to accept or reject EPA recommendations. As Hodge stated, "since the new Act's 
introduction 21 months ago, some 200 projects had undergone assessment. Of those 
only a handful had been rejected outright, including Bond Corporation's controversial 
Knightsbridge project in City Beach" (Waddacor, 1988, p. 26). This highlighted the 
significance given to environmental impacts during development proposals, rather than 
suggest the Act or the EPA may contain too much power. Moreover, despite criticisms 
that the new 1986 EP Act gave the EPA too much power and influence, it is the elected 
Government of the day that makes the final decision on all development proposals. 
Conclusion. 
After considerable delay the Burke Government finally introduced the Environmental 
Protection Act1986 into Parliament, which was proclaimed on 20 February 1987, and 
with the accompanying Repeal Act replaced the 1971 EP Act. It increased the powers of 
the EPA, with a broader definition of the environment to include social aspects, and 
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with the allocation of new pollution control measures. It provided for a more central role 
for the Minister of the Environment. The Minister was give.n power to set environmental 
conditions for all proposals, some of which were previously carried out by other 
Ministers (EPA Annual Report, 1986-87, p. 7). The new Act formalised the system of 
EIA, and provided greater clarity for the assessment procedures in Western Australia. 
This was a clear objective of the legislation, which sought to consolidate the Authority's 
evolved practice on environmental assessment. 
There were criticisms however from developers and the AAPC, who objected to an 
enhanced role for the EPA in EIA, and the increased powers for the environment 
Minister. The 1986 EP Act addressed a number of deficiencies in the previous 
legislation, with for example providing greater clarity for EPPs, which were considered 
among the best means of addressing the cumulative impacts of development (Bailey and 
English, 1991, p. 198; Cox, 1994, p. 307). The new Act was cumbersome and 
ambiguous in areas and can be improved upon. This was evident in Pt V, with 
insufficient specification for pollution contro1 measures as illustrated in the Palos 
Verdes case. However, the 1986 EP Act was a significant improvement on the previous 
legislation and despite its limitations retained a great deal of flexibility, which was 
perhaps its greatest strength. II has increased the capacity and influence of !he EPA in 
environmental management in Western Australia, especially through the Authority's 
enhanced role in ElA procedures. 
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Chapter Four 
The significance of the 1993 Amendments to the Environmental Protection Act 
1986. 
There were many criticisms from industry following the proclamation of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1986 (EP Act). The main areas of contention were the 
overriding powers of the Act, the enhanced role of EPA in environmental impact 
assessment (ElA) procedures, and pollution control powers. The EPA was criticised at 
various stages by powerful groups such as the AustraJian Association of Planning 
Consultants and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nicholson, 26 August 1992, 
p. Jl). However, the attack on the EPA from the Chamber of Mines and Energy in 
November 1991 was arguably the most forceful. It was contained in a document titled 
"Resource Development in Western Australia". The report was critical of the expanding 
role and powers of the EPA, which inc1uded involvement in planning issues and social 
impact assessment (Allen, 1991, p. 13). It was extremely critical of the central role of 
the EPA in environmental assessment and blamed the Authority for delaying 
development proposals. 
The EPA Chairman Barry Carbon responded by saying that the Chamber of Mines had 
gone too far by fabricating total nonsense. He argued that the report effectively attacked 
the integrity of the EPA and its staff. Carbon replied to the "shameful lies" of 
development delays by citing 4,875 mining approvals granted in Western Australia 
during the 1991 financial year (Carbon, 1991, p. 3). At the time the report was released 
the EPA had eight mining projects out for review, seven of which were waiting for the 
proponent and only one was waiting on the EPA to complete. This did not support the 
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Chamber of Mines argument that the EPA was holding up development proposals. The 
report acknowledged the upcoming review of the EP Act and recommended that 
consideration should be given to "restoring to the political level, rather than ... 
independent appointees, the task of effectively balancing environmental and 
development values" (Allen, 1991, p. 16). This statement was completely misleading, as 
under the Act the Government makes the final decision on all environmental issues. It is 
unJikely that the Chamber of Mines were unaware of the procedures contained in the 
Act. Therefore such a forthright attack on the EPA was more likely designed to send a 
clear message to the Government before its review of the EP Act. 
Section 124 (I) of the 1986 EP Act required the Government, through the Minister for 
the Environment, to review the operation and effectiveness of the Act as soon as 
practicable after five years. It required the Minister to consider and have regard to the 
effectiveness of the operations of the EPA, and the need for the continuation of its 
functions. The same considerations applied to any group, committee, council or panel 
established by the Minister or the EPA under s25 (I). The Minister was also required to 
submit a report based on the review, before each House of Parliament as soon as 
practicable following completion, si24 (2). In line with these statutory obligations the 
Labor Minister for the Environment Bob Pearce announced on I April 1992, the 
establishment of an Independent Advisory Committee to oversee the review of the EP 
Act (Ramsey, 1992, p. 1). The Minister instructed the committee conducting the review 
to hold public seminars call for public submissions and consult widely with interested 
parties. 
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Independent Review of the Environmental Protection Act. 
There were over 140 submissions to the Independent Advisory Committee chaired by Dr 
John Ramsey. Head of Department of the Environment and Planning Tasmania, with the 
two other members being industrialist Harold Clough and environmentalist Neil Blake. 
The majority of submissions even those critical of the EPA, acknowledged that the Act 
was generally well structured and had been a model for environmental protection in 
other states (Nicholson, 26 August 1992, p. II). Key submissions from industry, 
including the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Chamber of Mines and 
Energy, called for the roles of EPA chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) to be 
split. This was rejected by EPA chairman Barry Carbon who maintained that the 
combined role, enabled the chairman to directly control staff which is necessary for a 
truly independent EPA (Cake, 1992, p. 8). The Chamber of Mines and Energy restated 
its objections to the involvement of the EPA in "socio-political" issues. It emphasised 
the need to speed up the system of appeals and argued that the public nature of EPA 
recommendations placed significant leverage on the Minister (Mine Ufe, 1991, p. 15). 
However, the Minister for the environment, Bob Pearce stressed that the environmental 
protection laws were "not up for grabs", and that the review was likely to be directed 
towards improvement rather than a major change of principle or direction. 
The report of the Independent Advisory Committee for the review of the EP Act was 
released for public comment in October 1992. It was an extensive report with 50 
recommendations containing a number of subclauses. The committee found that the 
EPA was an extremely effective organisation with strong and capable leadership, and 
supported the continuation ofits functions (Ramsey, 1992, p. vii). There were four main 
features of the 1986 EP Act that the committee considered central to the system of 
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environmental protection in W A. These were the primacy of the Act and its as~essmcnt 
process; the right of public participation; independent EPA advice on environmental 
issues; and final decisions on environmental issues taken by the Minister, the 
Government or Parliament. Hence the committee recommended that ali of these 
procedures be retained (Ramsey, 1992. pp. 8-14). This in effect was a vote of confidence 
in the basic operation of the 1986 EP Act. 
On the controversial issue of whether the position of chainnan and CEO should be split, 
the committee examined both sides of the argument. It concluded, that there is a 
''perception in the minds of some", of too much influence and power residing in one 
person under the combined role. However, the committee found no evidence to suggest 
the combined role had resulted in undue influence or unreasonable exercise of power 
(Ramsey, 1992, p. 37). Moreover, the report illustrated the provisions in the Act that 
provided a check on the exercise of power. It noted that the Chairman of the EPA is 
only one of five members involved in EPA decisions. It stressed that the EPA is only an 
advisory body, with the Government making the final decision on all environmental 
matters including appeals (Ramsey, 1992, p. 38). The committee made some 
recommendations to address the "perception" of power and influence of the combined 
position. These included inter alia the removal of the CEO role in advising the Minister 
on appeals; giving the EPA no greater role in the appeal process than any other 
participant; and ensuring that all appeals are considered by the Minister with the benefit 
of advice from an independent Commissioner for the Environment (Ramsey, 1992, p. 
39). Consequently, the committee recommended that the combined position of 
Chairman/CEO should be retained for at least 12 to 18 months, to examine the 
effectiveness of the proposed changes. 
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Labor Strategy Before Election? 
The Labor Government did not act on the recommendations made by the Ramsey 
advisory committee. Instead it referred the entire report to legal expert Professor 
Richard Harding, to review the legal implications of the proposed changes. Professor 
Harding was asked to advise the Government on "how best to implement the 
recommendations of the three-member Ramsey committee" (Nicholson, 27 April 1993, 
p. 8). Professor Harding completed his review and submitted his report to the 
Environment Minister Jim McGinty, who took it to a Cabinet meeting on 7 December 
1992. However, the Labor Government delayed releasing the report before the State 
EJection. A number of environmental groups inc1uding the Conservation Council 
criticised the Labor Government, for its politically motivated delaying tactics (The 
Greener Times, March 1993, p. 5). The Conservation Council claimed that some 
Ministers feared making the EPA stronger than it already was, and that the Government 
decided to wait until after the election before taking a tough stance on the EPA. On the 
other hand the Labor Government showed its intentions albeit on the eve of an election, 
by controversially reappointing Barry Carbon as EPA chairman and CEO for five years, 
starting from I January 1993 (Nicholson, 19 January 1993, p. 28). 
Subsequently, the two main parties differed on the issue of the combined role of 
chairman/CEO and the powers of the EPA during the election campaign. The Coalition 
announced, it would take the decision demanded by industry groups during the review 
of the EP Act, and split the roles of EPA chairman and chief executive (Nicholson, 19 
January 1993, p. 28). This was a complete turnaround from the earlier views expressed 
by Uberal MLA Kevin Minson. ht February Minson dismissed concerns from 
conservationists that a Coalition Government would weaken the EPA. He said, "he 
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could see no reason to split the roles of chainnan and chief executive". Minson also said 
that it was important to keep the EPA strong and independent and that its chairman 
should never be directed (Nicholson, 23 February 1993, p. 4). During the election 
campaign the Labor party vowed to strengthen the EPA by enacting the 
recommendations of the Independent Advisory Commiuee, if it were returned to office. 
The Labor party promised to make the appeals system more independent, and to remove 
the obligation on the EPA to seek the Minister's pennission to prosecute for pollution 
offences (Nicholson, 19January 1993, p. 28). 
Removal of Environmental Protection Authority Members. 
Upon gaining office in 1993, the CoaHtion Government, were confronted with a 
substantial State debt, that had its genesis in the WA Inc. excesses of the 1980s. As a 
result, one of Premier Richard Court's first initiatives was to set up an Independent 
Commission to Review Public Sector Finances (Black and Phillips, 1993, p. 421). The 
Commission was chaired by Les McCarrey, a former Under-Treasurer and Director-
General of Economic Development. Other members of the Commission included 
managerial Directors, P. J. Leonhardt from Coopers and Lybrand, Charles MacKinnon 
of Lothbury Ldt. and Peter Unsworth of Unsworth Financial services. Volume One of 
the Report was released on 24 June 1993, and was extremely critical of an inefficient 
Public Service (Black and Phillips, 1993, p. 422). Moreover, from 1992, public concern 
with the environment was displaced throughout Australia by more pressing issues, such 
as unemployment and health. For example, the environment was notably absent as an 
issue in the 1993 Federal election. In addition membership of environmental groups 
reduced by almost 50 per cent between 1993 and 1996 (Pakulski, Tranter and Crook, 
1998, p. 241). 
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Hence, another initiative from the Coalition Government in 1993, was the decision to 
close down the Social Impact Unit (SIU) as part of its policy to speed up development 
proposals (Wood and Bailey, 1994, p. 42). This was done despite the endorsement of the 
SIU, by the Independent Advisory Committee in 1992 (Ramsey, 1992, p. 74). Moreover, 
the Government upheld its controversial promise to separate the joint position of EPA 
chainnan and chief executive of the Department. The decision to do so before 
Parliament resumed combined with the inappropriate method chosen, exacerbated the 
controversy and fuelled the impression that vindictiveness lay behind the move (Brown, 
Nicholson and Quekett, 1993, p. II). The separation of the combined roles in effect 
removed Bany Carbon from his position after serving eight years. Initially a defiant 
Carbon vowed he would fight the Government and not let the EPA's strength and 
independence, be destroyed (Nicholson, 26 April 1993, p. 1). While explaining the 
Government's position, the Environment Minister Kevin Minson, said that he had 
obtained advice from the Crown Law Department, stating that the contracts of Carbon 
and three other EPA members were inva1id. This version of events was disputed by the 
Labor Opposition environment spokesperson Jim McGinty. 
The Opposition spokesperson said that if such advice were given the Crown Law 
Department would have contacted him as fonner Environment Minister. McGinty later 
released a confidential Cabinet minute, which he said proved Carbon and the three other 
EPA members were properly appointed (Nicholson and Quekett, 26 May 1993, p. 4). 
Minson was also severely criticised for his part in releasing inaccurate details of 
Carbon's salary package. Moreover, the Opposition questioned the degree of influence 
Tim Meagher, one of Minson's advisers had on the Government's decision. In 1989 for 
example, Carbon had been highly critical of Meagher's submission for a development 
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proposal near Bold Park for Bond Corporation. Meagher responded with a scathing 
attack on the EPA in 1991, accusing it of causing great uncertainty in land tenure and 
planning in Western Australia (Nicholson, 27 April 1993, p. II). For his part Minson 
insisted throughout, that "he was just sorting out administrative confusion from the 
previous government, and had no intention of gutting the Authority" (Nicholson, 27 
May 1993, p.ll). However, the Coalition Government finally admitted that it did not 
have proof that the appointments were improperly made and validated the three EPA 
members contracts. Moreover, Carbon accepted an out of court settlement, which 
suggested, his contract was also valid (Nicholson, 27 October 1993, p. 23). In an ironic 
twist, Carbon's knowledge and integrity was recognised by the Federal Labor 
Government who selected him to lead the Commonwealth Environmental Protection 
Agency in October 1993 (Nicholson, 27 October 1993, p. 23). 
Notwithstanding the furore surrounding the Coalition Government's mishandling of the 
situation and the personal anguish inflicted upon Barry Carbon, there were many who 
condemned the decision to split the EPA. Among the most notable and influential was 
Bert Main who had served on the EPA for fourteen years. He was Chairman of the EPA 
between 1982 and 1985, and therefore was directly involved in administering the EPA 
in conjunction with a separate Departmental Head (Nicholson and Quekett, 27 April 
1993, p. 1). Main said that the splitting of the EPA, by Sir Charles Court's Government 
in 1980 was a failure. He said it was impossible to administer without clear lines of 
communication to one single authority for making decisions. He said "over time if you 
finish up with two different agendas, two different sets of goals and a chairman and a 
head of department that are not communicating, then the environment will suffer" 
(Nicholson and Quekett. 27 Aprill993, p. 1). 
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This view was backed up by Professor Richard Harding, who confirmed he had advised 
the Lawrence Labor Government' not to split the combined roles. His report supported 
the findings of the three-member Ramsey committee, who found no evidence of abuse 
of power or influence under the combined role. Professor Harding said that the 
opposition to one person holding both roles came from the Western Australian mining 
lobby, but they were unable to identify a single case that acted to the detriment of a 
proponent. In his view "the objections seemed ideological rather than empirical" 
(Nicholson, 27 April1993, p. 8). Despite compelling advice from a number of diverging 
sources the Coalition Government were committed to restructuring the EPA. 
Introduction of 1993 Amendments. 
The Coalition Government introduced the Environmental Protection Amendment Act 
1993, into Parliament, which altered the structure and function of the EPA. The 
Environment Minister Kevin Minson reiterated his position by making it clear to the 
House, that neither he nor the Government had any intention of restricting the 
Authority's independence (WAPD, 5 August 1993, p. 1999). The Government claimed 
that the Bill would strengthen the Authority and make it more accountable. However, 
this was contested by a growing number of opponents who claimed that the measures 
were designed to weaken the independence of the Authority (Gardner, 1993, p. 40). The 
Bill contained three major changes to the EPA. It enabled the existing membership of 
the EPA to be dismissed and a new membership to be appointed; it allowed for the 
separation of the roles of Chairman of the Authority and CEO of the Department; and it 
required the deliberations of the Authority to be made public (W APD, 5 August 1993, p. 
1999). 
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The Labor Opposition continued its objections to what it described, as an attack on the 
independence of the EPA. The opposition spokesperson Jim McGinty condemned the 
Environment Minister for his earlier attempts to sack the EPA board. McGinty 
described the Minister's actions as "outrageous". He said that the Minister "failed in his 
attempts because of the pubiic outcry and now he is seeking to do the same thing by 
introducing statutory measures" (WAPD, 8 September 1993, p. 3419). The Opposition 
claimed that the independence of the EPA would be eroded, by allowing the Minister 
through the department to direct and control resources into specific areas. This was 
formerly the prerogative of the Chairman of the EPA under the combined r'lle, which 
helped ensure the Authority's independence. The Environment Minister Kevin Minson 
answered this criticism with the introduction of sl7A which stated that" the Minister 
shall ensure that the Authority is provided with such services and facilities as are 
reasonably necessary to enable it to perform its functions" (Environmental Protection 
Amendment Act 1993, p. 806). 
Additional areas of concern were the changes to the Authority's collective decision 
making, and the obligation lo make public the minutes of meetings held by the EPA. 
These requirements were contained under clause 8 and 9, of the amendments which the 
Opposition claimed were further proof of a "fundamental allack on the independence of 
the EPA" (WAPD, 8 September 1993, p. 3421). One of the greatest strengths of the 
Authority's recommendations had been that they represented a unified if not unanimous 
decision, similar lo lhe cabinet decisions of government Opponents of the changes 
feared that extensive media coverage of a split decision would reduce the force of EPA 
recommendations (Gardner, 1993, p. 43). The Opposition argued thai the amendments 
would place undue pressure on the individual part time members of the Authority, 
49 
I 
potentially affecting the overall decision making capacity and independence of the EPA 
(WAPD, 8 September 1993, p. 3422). The failure of the Coalition Government to 
provide definitive reasons for splitting the EPA did nothing to alleviate the perception, 
that the changes were ideologically driven and would result in a weakened EPA. In 
practical terms the 1993 amendments brought the environmental assessment process 
closer to government, which was a significant shift in function and philosophy from the 
19861egislation (Bache, 1998, p. 164). 
Judicial Appeals. 
This change in philosophy embodied in the 1993 amendments resulted in a greater use 
of judicial appeals. The case of Chappel v Environmental Protection Authority and Ors, 
was an attempt to compel the EPA to reinstate its earlier decision, to conduct a formal 
assessment of the Bunup Peninsula plan. While the court upheld the EPA decision, it 
was nonetheless critical of the Authority. The court suggested that the original decision 
had been an attempt by the EPA to extend its powers beyond its statutory obligations 
(Bache, 1998, p. 164 ). This was the first legal ruling that indicated the EPA may have 
endured a significant paradigm shift since the 1993 amendments. However, more 
compelling evidence followed to support the earlier predictions of a weakened and less 
independent EPA. This was revealr-<1 in the judgement handed down in Coastal Waters 
Alliance of Western Australia Inc v Environmental Protection Authority. The case 
involved an appeal by an alliance of interest groups against a 1994 EPA 
recommendation, which allowed the continuation of shell-sand mining in Cockburn 
Sound (Amalfi, 1996, p.l). On 26 March 1996, the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA 
had strayed beyond its statutory powers and that the report contained in Bulletin 739 had 
nothing to with environmental factors associated with the company's mining plans. 
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The implications of the ruling were considered serious enough to warrant an urgency 
motion in the Legislative Council the following day to debate the issue. Chief Justice 
David Malcolm's findings were revealed in Parliament during the debate (WAPD, 27 
March 1996, p. 483, 487). Justice Malcolm found, 
... That the EPA report was fundamentally flawed in so far as it attempted to 
find a political or commercial compromise of a kind which the relevant 
Ministers should be responsible for finding with the assistance of other 
advisers, having received a report on environmental matters. 
The Opposition, minor parties and conservation groups expressed alarm that the EPA 
based its recommendation on political rather than environmenta1 factors. Labor 
Opposition Leader in the Legislative Council John Halden, questioned the credibility of 
the EPA. He said that the EPA had gone from a "watchdog to a lame dog" as a direct 
result of the Government separating the bureaucracy from the Authority in 1993 
(W APD, 27 March 1996, p. 486). He called on the Government to re-establish the 
integrity of the EPA by clarifying the roles of the Authority and the Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP). An editorial in The West Australian on 28 March 1996 
was extremely critical of the 1993 legislative impact on the EPA. It cited a damming 
statement by the new Environment Minister Peter Foss, following the Supreme Court 
ruling in the Costal Waters case. Foss said, ''where the EPA went wrong is that it 
anticipated what the former minister would decide". The editorial stated that any 
suggestion of political manipulation of the EPA eroded the reason for its existence (The 
West Australian, 28 March 1996, p. 12). The EPA must provide fearless independent 
advice on environmental matters and leave political decisions to the elected government 
ofiheday. 
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Lack of Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) Independence? 
The extent of EPA independence was also questioned during its assessment of the 
Northbridge tunnel proposal. The tunnel was part of the infrastructure designed to 
alleviate traffic congestion in the City of Perth, with an estimated cost of 200 miilion 
dollars (Betti, 1996, p. 4). The northern traffic bypass system was an extensive project 
undertaken by the State Government and the decision to incorporate the tunnel under the 
City was extremely controversial. However, the EPA decided that the tunnel proposal 
only required a low level of assessment known as an Infonnal Review (Betti, 1996, p. 
4). This decision was based on advice received from the Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP). It was revealed by the Cities for People Group under the Freedom of 
Infonnation Act, that the DEP assessed the entire fonnal tunnel proposal, in just three 
and a half-hours (Betti, 1996, p. 6). The DEP did not consider air pollution, ground-
water or excavation as areas of concern when it formulated its checklist to the EPA. 
Former EPA member John Bailey said that the checklist was incomplete and that it had 
suggested the department had done the EPA's job (Betti, 1996, p. 6). Thisraises doubts 
about the capacity of the EPA to be truly independent when it has to rely on the DEP for 
administrative support. While the EPA makes the final decision on what level of 
assessment is required, it is significantly, curtailed by its small number of staff and 
resources. 
A lack of resources was highlighted in the 1994-95 EPA Annual report. The EPA 
considered it had a clear idea of its operational requirements, having operated for a full 
financial year under the new administrative arrangements. As a result, the EPA sought 
an increase in its budget from $340,000 to a total of $550,000 to function as required 
(EPA Annual Report, 1994-95, p.l9), This public plea for more money highlighted the 
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lack of independence enforced on the EPA under the 1993 amendments, and raised 
questions about funding guarantees under sl7A. The following year, the EPA chairman 
Ray Steedman expressed concern wilh the relationship between the EPA and the 
Department. He suggested that the problem could be rcoolved by giving the EPA 
corporate responsibility over the DEP (EPA Annual Report, 1995-96, p. 23). Moreover, 
Steedman was more outspoken during his public address to the Environment Institute in 
April 1997. He maintained that the EPA had no independence, no funds and no power, 
to carry out projects as these decisions were taken by the CEO of the Department. The 
EPA Chairman stated that, .. on numerous occasions the EPA has said we would like to 
proceed with a project, only to have it knocked back by the CEO" (Environment 
Business, April 1997, p. 8). This illustrated the problem of having a CEO responsible to 
the Minister, and an EPA dependent on the CEO for administrative decisions. This 
clearly indicated a complete loss of independence as a result of the 1993 amendments. 
Conclusion. 
FoiJowing the election in 1993, the Coalition Government displayed its commitment to 
speed up development proposals, by closing down the Social Impact Unit. Furthermore, 
the Government's decision to alter the structure of the EPA before Parliament met in 
June 1993 was clearly deemed to be unnecessary aud politically motivated. The events 
that followed amounted to a direct attack on the integrity of the EPA members, and on 
its chairmau Barry Carbon in particular. This was perceived as an attempt to silence the 
EPA aud allow miners aud developers to override environmental standards (Nicholson, 
24 May 1993, p. 4). After widespread controversy, the Government finally introduced 
the Environmental Protection Amendment Act 1993 into Parliament to split the 
Authority aud the Department. This move was widely criticised by various experts 
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including fanner chairman Bert Main, and was inconsistent with the Independent 
Advisory Committee's recommendations. It was also contrary to the advice provided to 
the Labor Government by Professor Richard Harding (W APD, 9 September 1993, p. 
3531). Moreover, the findings in the Coastal Waters case supported the predictions of a 
weakened and Jess independent EPA. These views were also backed up by inadequate 
allocation of resources to the EPA and the inability of the Chairman to direct resources 
into specific areas. Hence the evidence indicated, that the legislative amendments in 
1993 weakened the 1986 EP Act, and reduced the power and influence of the EPA in 
environmental management in Western Australia. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion. 
The purpose of this study was to examine th'! main environmental legislation, governing 
the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), in Western Australia from 1971 to 1996. 
This involved an analysis of the original Environmental Protection Act 1971 (EP Act), 
and its replacement 1986 EP Act. In addition the study explored the 1980 amendments 
to the 1971 EP Act, and the 1993 amendments to the 1986 EP Act. The task for this 
research was to determine 
i) whether the legislative changes significantly altered the structure and function of the 
EPA, and 
ii) whether these changes advanced or impaired the capacity of the EPA to provide 
adequate environmental advice. 
The main Environmental Protection Acts and the amendments reviewed in this study 
have significantly altered the structure and function of the EPA. With the exception of 
the 1986 EP Act, successive legislation has not evolved to meet the challenges of a 
rising population and development. In particular the 1980 amendments to the 1971 EP 
Act, and the 1993 amendments to the 1986 EP Act, appear to have restricted the scope 
for EPA involvement in environmental management. As a result, the amendments 
reduced the capacity of the EPA to provide adequate environmental advice to 
government in Western Australia. To a large extent the debate surrounding 
environmental legislation was impeded by ideological constraints among the major 
political parties. The main area of contention was the opposing view relating to a large 
EPA within the department, or a separated EPA serviced by the Department. Hence, 
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instead of seeking to improve existing environmental legislation the debate was reduced 
to and revolved around the "perceived" strength and independence of the EPA. 
The introduction of environmental protection legislation in Western Australia 
corresponded with government policy throughout a number of First world countries. 
Hence, the 1971 EP Art was a direct response to growing environmental awareness. The 
Act provided for a main administrative body the EPA, which was given wide ranging 
responsibility to protect and enhance the environment (W APD, 23 September 1971, p. 
1738). The EPA's powers, however, were restricted by a number of deficiencies in the 
legislation. This was particularly evident in section 28-57, which contained the 
requirements for environmental protection policies (EPPs). These requirements were 
extensive, lacked clarity and helped explain why no EPPs were developed by the EPA 
for the entire duration of the 1971 EP Act (Cox, 1994, p. 307). Other deficiencies in the 
Act included a narrow definition of the .. environment" and the non-specific provisions 
to deal with land clearing to control salinity. As a result the EPA lacked significant 
power and was restricted to an advisory role (Conacher, 1980, p. 54; Main, 1988, p. 
135). This lack of power may have helped persuade the Authority to pursue a more 
educative role in environmental management. 
From its inception in 1971, the EPA embarked upon an educative role to increase public 
involvement and awareness in environmental protection. Accordingly, a Committee for 
Understanding the Environment was establishr.d in 1973 by the EPA to ensure greater 
public participation (EPA, Annual Report, 1973, p. 10). The importance of public 
involvement was a constant objective of the EPA. This was achieved with regular 
advertisements for public submissions and published accounts of EPA 
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increased public ~warene'1S on environmental issues (Main, 1991, p. 23). Consequently, 
one of the main early achievements of the EPA was its contribution to enhanced public 
knowledge on environmental matters. In addition, the EPA was required to undertake 
various functions including pollution control measures and environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) procedures. 
Initially, a different system of EIA procedures was developed in Western Australia, 
when the EPA adopted an ad hoc approach for development proposals. However, a 
more direct involvement for the EPA in environmental impact assessment, became 
inevitable following a Commonwealth State agreement in 1977 (EPA Annual Report, 
1976-77, p. 19). Of course, this allowed for increased public scrutiny and made 
government decision making more difficult, especially when the decision was contrary 
to EPA recommendations. For example, in 1979 the Coalition Government came under 
intense pressure when it rejected EPA advice and granted approval for the Worsley 
Alumina refinery. At the time, this was widely reported as among the main reasons for 
introducing changes to the EP Act in 1980. 
The 1980 amendments were the first significant change to the 1971 EP Act since its 
formation. The changes resulted in removing the Director of Conservation and 
Environment from his position as chainnan of the EPA (Hollick, 1985, p. 123). This in 
effect separated the EPA from the Department and was widely seen as a clear attempt to 
weaken the Authority. A number of environmental groups including the Australian, and 
the Western Australian Conservation Councils', expressed alarm at the attack on the 
independence of the EPA (The West Australian, 21 October 1980, p. 3). Moreover, the 
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Labor Opposition was extremely critical of the restrictions placed on the EPA to publish 
its recommendations. The Opposition also expressed concern with the potential for 
greater interference by the Minister in the EPA (WAPD, 20 November 1980, p. 3813). 
In the aftermath of the 1980 amendments the efficiency and independence of the EPA 
was con~ .tined under the split roles. This was due to a Jack of specific administrative 
guidelines, combined with the diverging opinions and personalities of the respective 
heads, namely Barry Carbon and Colin Porter (Hodge, 1991, p. 98). Hence following a 
change to a Labor Government in 1983, and a period of apparent hesitancy, the first 
decisive action undertaken by the newly appointed, Minister for the environment Barry 
Hodge in 1986, was to realign the Department and the EPA to overcome these 
difficulties. 
In the same year, the Burke Labor Government final1y introduced the long awaited 
revised environmental protection legislation into Parliament. While the original1971 EP 
Act failed to give the EPA or the Minister any real power, the replacement 1986 Act 
was a significant improvement in that regard. The strength of the legislation was 
enhanced by the primacy given to the EP Act over the majority of Western Australian 
statutes s (5), and the guarantee of EPA independence from Ministerial direction s (8). 
In terms of protecting the environment, the 1986 EP Act was among the best in 
Australia and was adopted as a model in various parts of the world (Nicholson, 26 
August 1992, p. II). Therefore, this study found that the 1986 EP Act was the strongest 
environmental legislation enacted in Western Australia. Consequently, the capacity for 
the EPA to provide effective environmental advice was at its highest, following the 
proclamation of the 1986 EP Act, until the election of the Coalition Government in 
1993. 
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The 1986 EP Act increased the power and influence of the EPA with specific (EIA) 
procedures, and a broader definition of the "environment" to cover an increased number 
of social aspects (Bailey & English, 1991, p. 191). In addition to EIA's the 1986 EP Act 
provided the EPA with two other important statutory measures to assist with some of its 
functions (Singleton, 1992, p. 35). This involved improving the capacity for the EPA to 
develop environmental protection policies in Pt lli, and with the allocation of pollution 
control measures in Pt V. These statutory arrangements were offset by the advisory 
nature of EPA recommendations, with the final decision taken by the elected 
Government of the day (Johnson, 1988, p. 142). However, the success of any 
environmental legislation largely depends on the degree of political commitment given 
to it. Regrettably political commitment to the main environmental legislation in Western 
Australia has not been consistent over a number of decades. Hence, instead of seeking to 
improve deficiencies in the legislation, the Coalition Government set about restructuring 
the EPA after gaining office in 1993. 
Following the election in 1993, the Coalition Government disbanded the Social Impact 
Unit and upheld its controversial promise to separate the combined position of chairman 
of the EPA and chief executive of the Department. This in effect meant dispensing with 
the services of Bany Carbon, who had held the position for eight years (Nicholson, 26 
April 1993, p. 1). The decision to do so before Parliament resumed, combined with the 
inappropriate attempts to invalidate the contracts fuelled the controversy and provoked 
three months of polarised public debate (Nicholson, 27 October 1993, p. 23). After 
failing to revoke the contracts, the Government was forced to introduce the 
Environmental Protection Amendment Act 1993 into Parliament to split the Authority 
and the Department. This move was widely perceived as a direct attempt to weaken the 
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EPA (Gardner, 1993, p. 40). These concerns appeared to be justified in March 1996, 
when the findings in the Coastal Waters case supported the earlier predictions of a 
weakened, less independent EPA. These views were also backed up by inadequate 
allocation of resources to the EPA and the inability of the Chairman to direct resources 
into specific areas (Environment Business, April 1997, p. 8). Moreover, the decision to 
provide "adequate" funding to the EPA, under s 17A was in effect determined by the 
particular values and priorities of the government of the day (Bache, 1998, p. 164). 
Hence, the 1993 amendments significantly compromised the independence of the EPA, 
and the evidence suggested that the changes were largely due to ideological beliefs. 
A significant finding of this study, was the c1ear ideological difference between the two 
major parties concerning environmental legislation, and the strength and independence 
of the EPA. The Labor Party presided over stronger environmental legislation, during 
their time in office in Western Australia. This resulted in a more prominent role for the 
EPA under various Labor Governments. It was the Tonkin Labor Government that 
introduced the original 1971 EP Act, which established the EPA. While the Act was 
deficient in a number of areas the intention was to produce effective legislation for the 
protection of the environment in Western Australia (W APD, 23 September 1971, p. 
1737). The enactment of the 1971 EP Act was also consistent with government policy 
throughout a number of Western democracies, and was an important first step in 
Western Australia. In 1986, the Burke Labor Government realigned the Department and 
the EPA, to overcome difficulties that emanated from the 1980 amendments. In the 
same year the Government introduced the 1986 EP Act which significantly improved 
the existing environmental legislation and increased the power and influence of the EPA 
(Bache, Bailey and Evans, 1996, p. 487). 
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On the other hand, the Liberal Party expressed concern with the joint roles under the 
original 1971 Act, it introdliced legislation in 1980 to separate the combined roles, and 
it opposed that aspect of the 1986 Act (W APD, 16 October 1986, p. 3182). Moreover, 
the Coalition Government's decision to restructure the EPA without Parliament 
approval in 1993 highlighted this ideological position. To achieve its aims, the 
Government introduced the Environmental Protection Amendment Act 1993 into 
Par1iarnent to separate the Authority and the Department. This decision was contrary to 
the Independent Advisory Committee's recommendations, and was inconsistent with 
advice provided to the Labor Government by Professor Richard Harding in 1992 
(WAPD, 9 September 1993, p. 3531). As a result of this decision, the evidence indicated 
that the 1993 amendments restricted the scope of EPA involvement in environmental 
management. While this may ensure greater control by the Minister concerning 
environmental decision making, it can leave governments more open to criticism when 
errors occur or conflicts arise. It also required environmentalists to be more vigilant in 
raising public awareness and placing significant issues finnly on the political agenda. 
However, the Coalition Government has performed well in particular areas of 
environmental management. It can claim credit for endorsing the majority of 
Conservation Through Reserves Committee (CTRC) recommendations in the late 
1970s, which resulted in a significant portion of land being set aside for national parks 
(W APD, 9 September 1993, p. 3549). In addition, it was the Coalition Government that 
first acted on salinity, by halting widespread land-clearing in the South We:;t catchment 
areas in 1976. More recently, the Coalition Government was commended for its 
attempts to redress the extensive salinity problem facing Western Australia ( Capp, 1998, 
p. 31). Yet despite, improvements in particular areas, governments of all persuasions 
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appear to be constrained by their incapacity to link environmental protection with 
economic benefit over the long-term. 
Broader Implications of the Study. 
It would appear that the challenges facing environmentalists in gaining widespread 
acceptance for an alternative social paradigm are immense. While gains have been made 
in placing environmental concerns on the political agenda since the 1970s, the level of 
actual commitment is more difficult to quantify. For example, Me Cormick (1995, p. 
161) notes that the first ever Department of the Environment created in Britain was 
given greater significance than it deserved. In reality, the Department was a 
reorganisation of existing bureaucracy, which was given insufficient powers to cope 
with the magnitude of environmental management. The ideological belief that the free 
market provides the best means of solving environmental problems is common 
throughout First World countries, and stronger among conservative parties. This was 
apparent during the period of the Reagan administration in America, and for a large part 
of the Thatcher years in Britain (Me Cormick, 1995, p. 260). As a result, 
environmenta1ism had to compete with and became subordinate to a range of policy 
issues such as business investment, employment, education, health and housing. Hence, 
within the more powerful First World countries the attitudes and assumptions of the 
dominant exclusionist paradigm are still intact (Porter, and Brown, 1991, p. 32). 
The broader findings from this study would suggest that environmental concerns have 
not penetrated the exclusionist paradigm held by the main political parties in Western 
Australia. This contrasts with the more optimistic claims by Papadakis (1993, p. I, 104) 
that political institutions in Australia have undergone a significant paradigm shift to 
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incorporate environmentalism. While governments have responded to environmental 
concerns at various stages since the 1970s, these responses have tended to be a direct 
reaction to growing public pressure. For example, the 1971 EP Act was enacted during 
heightened universal public awareness (0' Brien, 1978, p. 41 ). Moreover, in 1986 the 
Labor Government was able to introduce the strongest environmental legislation in 
Western Australia following a resurgence in public concern with environmental issues 
(Nicholson, 26 August 1992, p. II; Wood and Bailey, 1994, p. 41). However, once the 
environment is displaced by more pressing issues on the public agenda governments 
shift their attention to higher priorities, as indicated by the Coalition Government's 
commitment to reduce State debt in 1993. 
In addition, environmental problems are compounded by the adversarial nature of the 
political system adopted in Australia. Under this system, decisions are taken with an 
emphasis on short-term political advantage. Since environmental issues tend to have a 
cumulative effect on natural resources (EPA Annual Repon, 1979-80, p. 4), the lack of 
long tenn environmental policy is a significant concern. For example, as early as 1973, 
the Western Australian EPA warned about the dangers of increased salinity, but 
governments failed to focus on the problem until the late 1990s. There are other 
examples of long term environmental problems that need to be addressed, including 
sustainable forest management and greenhouse gas emission reduction. However, the 
extent of these problems will only increase, unless governments adopt greater long-term 
vision, rather than pursue a reactionary response to environmental management. 
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